To put Zippy’s insights into my own terminology:
Authority characteristically involves the proposition of some good as superior to others and therefore binding. An authoritative act taking freedom as that good is either incoherent or a negation.
It is incoherent in that making freedom a superior good to others, but freedom is precisely the consideration of all goods as equal. Once one good is found superior over another, the others are put aside and the superior is pursued. However, freedom as the proposed good makes many or (in the asymptotically liberal case) all goods proposed.
It is a negation in that an authoritative act has some good in mind. However, freedom doesn’t have the character of some good, but a capacity to deliberate and determine some good. It is an attempt to instantiate a universal as a universal. Therefore, an authoritative act for freedom is no act at all, that is it doesn’t have the character of an actual authoritative act.