Personal Notes

  • Common good vs proper good as superior – false dichotomy? De Knoninck. 
  • Does God will man simply as constitutive of the order of the universe, that is filling in all the ontological levels such that man’s dignity is grounded simply is the perfection of the order of the universe? James Chasteck.
  • A person is not able to know and will the common good in virtue of reason but communicate its proper goods in a manner in virtue of being semiotic.
  • Communication of interiority is made a central theme in modern philosophy bc it happens but mod phil is unable to account for it.
  • Semiotics bridges the gap without undermining the great classical traditions. Semiotic Thomism and Deely.
  • Take the common good as superior. Man not only wills and participates in the common good, but communicates his inner life as a common good to be shared in. 
  • Each person of the Trinity communicates himself entirely to the others such that the personal life of each is utterly united and they are of the same substance, nature and essence.
  • There is something deficient in a sexual act where husband and wife do not communicate their pleasure to one another. It is a lack of unity and openness. Yet, this pleasure is a proper good which is impossible to share in itself, but needs to be shared in a manner. 
  • The inner life and semiosis was not thematic in the Scholastic period and there are deficiencies in Thomism to understanding and explaining this particularly in the context of animal semiosis and with the reductive account of ens rationis. 
  • The Incarnation seems to show us that personhood may be grounded in a nature but also transcends it. Christ has an individual human nature but is not a human person. As one person he takes on two natures, human and divine, in the hypostatic union.
  • Semiotics reveals something of the theology of the Trinity. Each person is a substantial relation and united as a triadic relation. A sign is a triadic relation. 
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